Monday 21 September 2015

The TDA Has A Bigger Challenge Than The Moshi Conference Which Was About Sharing Power




The TDA Has A Bigger Challenge Than The Moshi Conference Which Was About Sharing Power

  • ·         Dr Besigye’s Political Future Depends On How He Will Behave Towards The TDA
  • ·         The TDA Needs To Have A Superior Social Contract
  • ·         Stakeholders Like Farmers, Workers, Industrialists , Traders Etc Should Have Been Included





The Transitional Democratic Alliance has so far suffered a stalemate in regard to either selecting or electing the flag bearer who will challenge president Museveni for the Ugandan presidency in fast approaching 2016 presidential elections. .
A number of postponements and compromises have been taken to make sure that the Ugandan political opposition comes up with a single candidate to run as the sole flag bearer for the TDA
But while some analysts have predicted doom for the alliance, others have compared it (TDA) with that of Moshi conference which was formed to take over the affairs in Uganda after the fall of President Amin Dada. 
It’s therefore absurd that some people have not thought about the magnitude of the uphill task and challenges faced by the TDA.
And having explored the task that the TDA is undertaking, there is no way you can compare it with the Moshi conference.
TDA Versus UNLF
The Moshi conference comprised of a group of Ugandans who congregated in the Tanzanian town of Moshi with the intention of forming a government after the fall of president Amin.
There task was simply to agree on the leadership of the post Amin Uganda in their umbrella alliance which they termed as the UNLF.
They never had any challenges regarding effecting regime change since most of it was done by the TPDF. Their duty was simply to assemble the dishes for food distribution rather than cooking it.
The sowing, harvesting and cooking had been done by the Tanzanians who invaded and eventually threw out the Amin regime.
While mention is made of the two Ugandan fighting factions of Kikosi Maluum And Fronasa , some good research shows both groups had no military capacity to defeat Amin on their own.
I therefore think that the role and contribution of the Ugandans who congregated in Moshi in 1979 to form the UNLF has largely been over hyped mostly because its success depended on the goodwill and oversight of the late president Julius Nyerere.

If the Tanzanians had backtracked on the mission to remove Gen Amin from power, the Moshi conference and its baby child UNLF would have been as irrelevant as a scratched and used airtime card.
In fact there are stories that president Nyerere was toying with the idea of only facilitating war not beyond the Tanzanian border.
In other words Nyerere was of the view that the TPDF was mandated to chase Amin troops from Tanzanian soil but not to overrun Kampala. The Tanzanian leader had thought that a total invasion of Uganda would have come with bigger costs.
Of course there are rumors that it was Paul Muwanga who convinced president Nyerere to change his mind and chase Amin completely out of Uganda in a total invasion.
And had president Nyerere taken that course of action, the Moshi conference would have been rendered as useless.
Therefore there is no reason why people should glorify the Moshi conference since it was not in practical control of effecting regime change in Uganda.    
On the other hand the TDA has the uphill task of pulling down a 30 year old NRM regime from power.
For such a coalition to succeed there must be compromises and sacrifices made.
It’s therefore unfair for people to expect the TDA to dispense the process in a very short time.
It’s therefore imperative that a lot of time is invested in the process of pulling everybody on board before all the modalities are ironed out.
Challenges And Frictions
I have read a very good commentary by Hon Norbert Mao in regard to the challenges faced by the TDA.
Of course he complained about the disruptive tendencies of his party rival larod mayor erias lukwago.
He also talked of how the Luwero group (In reference to the NRM figures Prof Gilbert Bukenya, Amama Mbabazi and Col Kiiza Besigye) are dominating the TDA process.
He also talked of the fact that in normal times he should have been the most appropriate choice and concedes that he cannot be the candidate because we live in abnormal times today.   
Mao ably narrated the schemes by the FDC group led by Hon Odonga Otto which has tried to disrupt the TDA process. But he was wise enough to say that he believes that all changes aside, the TDA is the only chance the opposition has to enforce regime change in 2016.
The Besigye Factor
The attitude of the FDC flag bearer Col Besigye towards the TDA has also been put into perspective.
He seems to be a wiling member, but some of his party members think that KB is more powerful than the TDA
But there is an obvious case here that the fate of Dr Kiiza Besigye’s political fortunes will hugely depend on the way he conducts himself between now and the February 2016 elections.
If he becomes hostile to the TDA alliance, then his political career will be finished once and for all?.
If he however plays the card of a willing facilitator of the process that will deliver the TDA candidate, then his political fortunes will live beyond 2016 and probably pave way for him to contest again in 2021.
GAME OF NUMBERS
The other bone of contention lies in the fact that the members of the TDA are very few to facilitate the success of such a big project. Since politics is a game of numbers, you need everyone on board.
Although the major political parties have been represented, the alliance should have comprised of different stakeholders from across the country.
The stakeholders should have comprised of civil society, interest groups like workers, district leaders , teachers, private sector, farmers, manufacturers, industrialists, investors and others who believe in the regime change project.
But narrowing down the decision making of the TDA to a few individuals from the political parties has watered down the momentum of the project. For instance why lockout Erias Lukwago?
WHERE IS THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
The other challenge is that most members of the TDA alliance have not paid attention to the most important aspect of the project; the manifesto.
What policies do they want to implement that can provide hope for Ugandans after unseating president Museveni?
It so happens that none of the candidates is paying attention to the fact that elections are about providing people with a social contract.
And it’s that social contract that determines the electability of a given candidate.
If a TDA candidate emerges with regime change as the only song, then the TDA will have lost the contest.
Of course there is a general feeling that Ugandans are simply yearning for change.  I don’t know whether I can argue with that perspective.
But I doubt whether it’s sustainable for the TDA leadership to fall prey to cliché of regime-change as the only motivation for contesting in the 2016 elections.
Ugandans need to hear of concrete programs that are superior to those of the NRM.
They need to be convinced that the regime change project is justified and well founded on solid reasons rather than sentimental reasons.
Ugandans deserve to see a bright future in whoever vies for the presidency. Nevertheless, the imperfections regarding the composition of the TDA aside, a leader of the coalition must emerge.
The Author Fred Daka Kamwada Is A Writer , Journalist And Blogger contact him on ;kamwadafred@yahoo.com

Saturday 5 September 2015

Col Kiiza Besigye Has A Realistic Chance Of Claiming The Ugandan Presidency In 2021 Rather Than 2016



Col Kiiza Besigye Has A Realistic Chance Of Claiming The Ugandan Presidency In 2021 Rather Than 2016




Early this week, Col Kiiza Besigye managed to win the right to carry the FDC flag in the 2016 presidential elections after a protracted six month campaign battle against his comrade Gen Mugisha Muntu.
Apart from the fact that the campaigns were the first of the kind in Ugandan politics –in as far as intra party democracy is concerned –they did not have the practical political impact on Ugandans because it was not about accessing actual power at state house Nakasero.
To many ordinary Ugandans, the FDC Nambole fete was widely regarded as a cosmetic event designed to create an avenue for Col Besigye to bounce back and challenge president Museveni for the fourth consecutive time.
The Realities
However, what are the realistic chances of the indefatigable Colonel dethroning president Museveni in the 2016 political contest? The answers to that question are as diverse as the word itself.
The pollsters have not given Col Kiiza Besigye a chance at all in all the opinions polls conducted so far.
It leaves KB as the usual underdog in the political contest against president Museveni.
But as you all know, in politics nothing is a given. Anything can happen and you find KB at the helm of the country.
But for a start, there are two schools of thought in as far as Besigye’s claim to the Ugandan presidency is concerned.
There is a school of thought that asserts that the colonel has in fact never lost any of the three elections he has contested against president Museveni!.
The proponents of this school of thought use the verdict of the Ugandan high court which almost reversed the 2001 and 2006 elections but were restrained by a mere technicality that asserted that the irregularities were not substantial enough to warrant a reversal of Museveni victory.
The same proponents of the same Besigye-always- wins-school of thought also quote the former coordinator of intelligence services Gen David Sejjusa who is widely quoted to have said that KB has always won the elections but was only rigged out by the state. Those ones believe that what is required to get an assured win is the vigilance of the citizenry to guard the votes for KB.
The second school of thought asserts that while it’s true that Besigye is a good rubble rouser with a crowd to behold, his popularity is not substantial enough to dethrone president Museveni.
This second school of thought believes that Besigye has failed to articulate a more promising future for Ugandans and rather concentrated on attacking the person of president Museveni.
The same school of thought feels that Besigye needs to first articulate a more vivid policy alternative that is superior enough to beat president Museveni’s manifesto and eventually become president of Uganda.
While it’s true that both schools of thought make a lot of sense, in some ways, there is also the issue of the timing of Besigye’s presidential ambitions and the new political dynamics that make it difficult for him to make it.
RENTED SUPPORT
While KB’s presidential cause is supported by a section of Ugandans, approaching almost 2.5 million, it’s fair to argue that those Ugandans have always done it out of hate for president Museveni rather than love or unconditional support for KB.
In fact analysts insist that Besigye has been riding on the support that voted for former presidential contender Hon Paul Kawanga Semogerere-and the same group would vote anyone who contests against president Museveni.
Given such a scenario, the proponents of that school of thought contend that Besigye has been thriving mostly on rented support rather than on the support of people who believe in him as someone who can deliver the regime change he normally agitates for.
His worst evil has been his chronic failure to build a strong grassroots power base to add on the rented support he has been enjoying over the years.
And given the political dynamics in the last five years, Besigye can no longer thrive on the rented support because it has been grossly eroded by events.
For instance the block vote that he used to enjoy from northern Ugandan has been diminished after the end of the civil war of Joseph Kony.
Today Besigye cannot be assured of the support that he used to generate because president Museveni has injected a lot of resources to rehabilitate northern Uganda.
The only area where Besigye can somehow stir some excitement is eastern Uganda-which we would rightly consider as a form of swing state.   
And his Gen Mugisha Muntu rightly managed to fault Besigye for not having made any attempts at building the structures that would add numbers to the cause of regime change.
The Transitional Democratic Alliance
Those dynamics aside, the emergence of the TDA also puts Besigye in a very complicated position because there are new political bulls in the kraal with intentions to contest for the presidency
Given the fact that Besigye has contested and lost three times, it’s unlikely that he will be a marketable brand in the TDA
There is, therefore, a strong possibility that KB will be requested to give chance to a new player to challenge president Museveni in the 2016 presidential election.
In fact evidence shows that the Museveni camp is more comfortable with a Besigye candidature than a new presidential contestant.
Why?
Because having defeated KB three consecutive times already, they {Museveni camp} seem to have the formular to use against him.
But with a new contender, let’s say like Hon Amama Mbabazi Or Prof Gilbert Bukenya , there is a fear that the population can make a rash decision and vote for a new kid on the block.
THE BEST OPTION
In fact, the best option for Besigye at the moment should have been to skip this 2016 election, to give chance to a new contender to challenge president Museveni.
Then after abstaining a bit, he can bounce back in 2021 as a contender.
By 2021, there is a high possibility that president Museveni will not be eligible to contest, since he will be barred by the age limit-unless he tampers with the constitution to lift the age limit that bars Ugandans above 75 years from contesting the presidency.
By 2021, KB will be in his 60s and strong enough to ride on the sympathy vote of Ugandans who have seen him suffer with the political struggle over the years.
The Abdoulaye Wade Precedence
If Besigye runs in 2021, he will not be as old as Senegal\s Abdoulaye Wade who contested and lost three times before he triumphed at the fourth time when he was around 80 years old.
Mr. Wade ran for President four times, beginning in 1978, before he was elected in 2000. Wade first ran for President in February 1978 against Senghor, taking 17.38% of the vote.
Subsequently he ran in the presidential elections of 1983 and 1988, taking second place each time, behind Senghor's successor Abdou Diouf.
By the time Abdoulaye Wade shot to power in 2000, he was already very old but he managed to win a re-election that saw him serve two terms. And there is a big chance that Besigye can emulate wade if he makes the right decision and abstains from the 2016 electoral contest, as he had indeed done earlier on.
Of course some political events may not be necessarily be imitated, but there is a good chance that Besigye can have a more realistic chance in 2021 than 2016.
By that time a Museveni candidature is unlikely to make sense to Ugandans the way it does in 2016 because the political environment will be more conducive for regime than today.

 The author Fred Kamwada-Kamwada is a Ugandan journalist and blogger. contact him on kamwadafred@gmail.com